Keeler v. City of Cumberland, No. S-96-167, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8090 (D. Md. June 10, 1996). A Roman Catholic church and monastery dating from the 19th century are located in a municipal historic district. The Cumberland Historic Preservation Commission denied the church a permit to demolish the unoccupied monastery and construct a Church Annex "for the good of the parish." The church challenged the local historic preservation ordinance under RFRA. The court dismissed the RFRA claim, finding that RFRA violates separation of powers doctrine by requiring courts to employ a standard of judicial review for 1st Amendment cases which was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Smith.

Kennedy v. Peters, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2429 (N.D. Ill. March 1, 1995). Court ruled that, "even if RFRA, and not O'Lone and [Smith], supplies the applicable standard" and even assuming prison regulations substantially burdened inmate's free exercise, the regulations at issue were narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of prison security. In its consideration of the substantial burden issue, court stated: "as one court has held, it is the religious adherent's obligation to demonstrate that the religion requires the practice he claims has been substantially burdened." (citing Bryant v. Gomez, supra). Court also commented that, "[w]hile the higher standard mandated by RFRA would appear to apply to inmates, the Seventh Circuit has observed that there may be constitutional questions concerning its validity, see Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994)."

Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. February 16, 1994) Prisoners challenged restricted access to religious literature of the Hebrew Israelite faith. Court held RFRA to be retroactive in application and wrote that, while defendant had satisfied the compelling interest prong, it failed to adopt the "least restrictive means" of accomplishing that interest.

Lee v. Armontrout, 39 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. November 9, 1994). In appeal of case regarding prison's failure to recognize Nation of Islam as a religion, court rejected inmate's RFRA argument because it was raised for first time in the reply brief. See also Scarpino v. Grosshiem, 852 F. Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa April 13, 1994)(rejecting under O'Lone inmates' claim that mandatory participation in "twelve step AA-type program" violated free exercise and noting that the "parties d[id] not address the effect, if any, of [RFRA]. . . on the free expression analysis").

Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. December 27, 1994). Physicians claimed that state law authorizing physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill and requiring their participation in ways that were contrary to their religious convictions violated 1st Amendment and RFRA. Court granted a preliminary injunction of the law until the constitutional concerns could be fully heard and analyzed.

Levinson - Roth v. Parries, 872 F. Supp. 1439 (D. Md. January 5, 1995). State officials moved for summary judgment of Jewish woman's claim that her free exercise rights were violated when detention center required her to remove her wig and wear a pantsuit. Citing RFRA, court found that removal of the woman's wig did not substantially burden her free exercise rights, and thus granted summary judgment to defendants on this part of her claim. Court also found that defendants' failure to present any evidence to justify requiring the woman to wear a pantsuit precluded grant of summary judgment to defendants on that claim.

*Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. March 27, 1995). Court preliminarily enjoined prison from interfering with inmate's attempts to maintain a kosher diet, keep facial hair at a certain length and wear head covering of a particular color because inmate had demonstrated that each of these practices were "required by his religion, central to his religious doctrine, and substantially burdened." Court denied portion of injunction request relating to inmate's vow of poverty, however, finding no substantial burden on free exercise. Court commented that RFRA "may lead to a flood of bogus prisoner claims," but that the inquiry into sincerity and "the requirement that a prisoner demonstrate that there is a substantial burden to a central religious belief serves [a] screening function."

Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. April 3, 1996). In consolidated case in which Muslim inmate and inmate belonging to Moorish Science Temple of America claimed RFRA violations for interference with ritual festivities, court adopted a more "generous definition" of a substantial burden on religious exercise under RFRA:

a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning of [RFRA], is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression than manifests a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.

Court suggested, however, that it was appropriate for courts "to separate center from periphery in religious observances" and added that "when it is known without need for judicial inquiry that the practice in question either is or is not mandatory, this adds weight to, or subtracts weight from, the substantiality of the burden." Court also stated that Muslim inmate, who was seeking only damages, was "entitled to sue the prison officials rather than the State of Illinois and d[id] not face the bar of the [11th] Amendment." In accordance with these findings, court reversed and remanded judgment against Muslim inmate on RFRA claim but affirmed judgment dismissing Moorish inmates' claim.

Malik v. Brown, 65 F. 3d 148 (9th Cir. September 8, 1995). Court issued order memorializing its adoption of RFRA as the proper standard governing the case. Court had previously reversed and remanded a summary judgment grant in favor of prison officials because it found that issues of fact existed as to whether they had violated inmate's right to use both his religious and committed names on various documents. Although court noted that RFRA required a different standard than the one adopted in its earlier opinion, it stated that, if it had applied RFRA, the inmate still would have prevailed.

May v. Baldwin, 895 F. Supp. 1398 (D. Or. August 7, 1995). Rastafarian inmate alleged that his 1st Amendment rights were violated when prison officials, pursuant to state prison regulations, ordered him to undo his dreadlocks. Defendants did not dispute that such a requirement substantially burdened inmate's religious beliefs, but argued that requirement satisfied RFRA because it was narrowly tailored to further compelling interest of prison safety. Defendants also claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the right not to undo dreadlocks was not a clearly established constitutional right. On the basis of these arguments, court granted summary judgment to defendants.

Muslim v. Frame, 891 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995). Former Muslim inmate sought damages and injunctive relief, claiming prison headgear restrictions violated 1st Amendment. Because plaintiff had been released from prison following filing of complaint, court denied injunctive relief as moot. Finding issues of fact as to whether prison policy represented a substantial burden on inmate's free exercise and was the least restrictive means of furthering compelling interest in prison security, court denied cross motions for summary judgment. Court rejected arguments that plaintiffmust prove religious practice at issue was mandated by his faith or central to his religious doctrine, stating that "[t]he Supreme Court has never required that a plaintiff bringing a free exercise claim demonstrate the centrality of a religious practice or belief" and that "the legislative history of RFRA makes clear that a showing of religious motivation is all that the Act requires." Although issue of RFRA's constitutionality was not presented, court "nonetheless note[d] that Congress [S]ection 5 authority allows it to provide greater protection to constitutional rights that the bare constitutional minimum." (citation omitted)

Muslim v. Frame, 897 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. August 23, 1995). Defendants moved for reconsideration of denial of summary judgment on inmate's claim that headgear restrictions "no-hat" rule violated 1st Amendment. Court rejected defendants' argument that a burden on free exercise would not be substantial unless it interfered with a person's ability to practice religion generally, stating that "[i]t would be curious to find that RFRA barred challenges to governmental restrictions on religion as long as the plaintiff could practice, say, two-thirds of his religion." Reviewing RFRA's legislative history, court also rejected argument that a burden on religious practice is not substantial unless the practice at issue is mandated by a faith, stating that:

[A] plaintiff satisfies his burden under RFRA by demonstrating that (1) the practice he wishes to engage in is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief, and (2) governmental conduct has substantially burdened his ability to engage in this practice. . . . Just as a determination of centrality is beyond the judicial 'ken,' so would a determination of whether religious practices are compelled by religion necessarily place judges in the untenable position of determining religious doctrine. Although court dismissed plaintiff's damage claims against defendants due to qualified immunity, it gave him additional time to reinstate previously dismissed injunctive relief claim because plaintiff was once again incarcerated.

*In re Newman, 183 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Kan. April 20, 1995). Bankruptcy trustee sued church to recover tithes transferred to it by debtors, and church asserted free exercise defense. Court ruled that relevant section of bankruptcy code did not offend 1st Amendment: it was neutral, generally applicable and had no more than an incidental effect on religion. Applying RFRA, court cited the descriptions of a substantial burden set forth in Werner v. McCotter, infra, and Graham v. C.I.R., and ruled that, although "[t]ithing is [a] central tenet of the debtors' religion, . . . [the code provision], by its own operation, [did] nothing to prevent the debtor's fulfillment of their personally held religious obligation to tithe and, therefore, does not place a 'substantial burden' on the debtors' practice of their religion." Court also noted a narrowly tailored compelling governmental interest in the administration of the statutory section at issue and the bankruptcy code as a whole. See also In Re Faulkner, 165 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. March 28,1994).(rejecting 1st Amendment and RFRA challenge to trustee's recovery for similar reasons); In Re Young, infra.

Orafan v. Rashid, 1995 WL 506808 (N.D.N.Y. August 25, 1995). Citing RFRA and 1st Amendment, plaintiffs objected to prison policy requiring Shi'ite Muslims to share a mosque with other Muslim denominations. Court rejected inmates' claim for injunctive relief, noting that the prison also required other religious denominations, such as Protestants and Catholics, to share worship facilities.

Osborne v. Power, 890 S.W.2d 574 (Ark. December 16, 1994). Citing RFRA, homeowners sought stay of court order requiring them to reduce substantially the size, extravagance and volume of their Christmas display. Court denied motion for stay, stating that, because the case involved "public and private nuisance, not religious beliefs, . . . RFRA is simply not controlling."

Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Ky. March 3, 1995). Court granted summary judgment to prison because it found that, even if cutting of Hasidic Jewish inmate's earlocks constituted a substantial burden on his free exercise, it was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest of prison safety, identification and sanitation. In its discussion of a substantial burden under RFRA, the court noted that it was "not in a position to judge the centrality of this religious belief to [the inmate's] free exercise of religion." Court also stated that "the ability to expand the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of Rights has been held to be within Congress' power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 57 L.Ed. 2d 522, 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978)."

Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. April 10, 1995). Protestant elementary school teacher claimed employment discrimination when Catholic school failed to renew her contract because she was not Catholic. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment for the diocese, ruling under RFRA that "[t]he state simply has no interest, and certainly no compelling interest, in requiring church operated schools to employ teachers of other faiths or of no faiths." A concurring opinion "question[ed] Congress's authority to legislate the standard of judicial review applicable to a free exercise of religion claim," but would have applied strict scrutiny to the claim for other reasons.

Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. August 8, 1994). Former Catholic theology teacher alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") by Archdiocese. Court granted summary judgment to Archdiocese, holding that ADEA's application to the case would violate 1st Amendment. Court also found that RFRA supported its ruling because the government's interest in eradicating age discrimination was not compelling given the church's fundamental right to choose persons to teach its ecclesiastical doctrine.

Prins v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 1996). Jewish inmate claimed transfer to prison with less desirable kosher food and no Orthodox services violated RFRA. The court affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for defendant prison. The court noted that the transfer facility "does provide kosher food and [plaintiff's] challenge must be to the quality of that food at that facility rather than to the transfer." With regard to the services at the transfer prison, the court stated:

As with the kosher diet issue, [Plaintiff] does not claim that Jewish services at [the new facility] were inadequate; he challenges only the particulars of the religious experience at [that facility]--such as the available format and inspirational quality--as to which [the transferor prison] officials cannot be expected to inquire into, investigate, or consider. Any claim that the [transfer facility] services substantially burdened [plaintiff's] rights under RFRA cannot be maintained as a challenge to the [transferor] officials' decision to transfer him there."

Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Wisc. July 31, 1995). Inmate claimed prison's refusal to deliver "Racial Loyalty" issues of "Church of the Creator" newspaper violated RFRA. Court found no substantial burden because inmate failed to show that possession of such issues was "a required or important part of his religion" or that he would be "unable to practice his religion" without such material. Court also noted that there was no evidence that his religious practice was "detrimentally affected" by loss of material. Further, even if a substantial burden was shown, court stated, prison's action were narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of prison safety. Therefore, the court did not address challenge to RFRA's constitutionality, although it specifically noted the Sasnett decision, infra, which upheld the Act as constitutional.

Rourke v. Department of Correctional Services, 1995 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 19068 (N.D.N.Y. November 27, 1995). Plaintiff, a native American Indian employed as a corrections officer, brought a RFRA claim against the state department of corrections after he was suspended for refusing to cut his hair for religious reasons. The court found that RFRA abrogates the 11th Amendment bar of suits against state governments in federal court, that it creates a private cause of action, and that it applies retroactively. Because the court found that plaintiff's sincere religious belief was substantially burdened by defendants and a state court had already concluded that defendants had no legitimate interest in doing so, the court granted summary judgment for plaintiff on the RFRA claim.

*Rust v. Clarke, 883 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Neb. April 26, 1995). Asatru inmates requested declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging prison's denial of various items, privileges and individualized worship time violated RFRA. Because court felt it was "simply not suited to announce the 'correct' interpretation" of Asatru religion, it assumed prison actions interfered with beliefs "central to [p]laintiffs' religious doctrine," and thus found a substantial burden. However, court also found prison actions were narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of "protecting the rights of all [inmates] to freely exercise their religion by equitably allocating finite resources among the numerous denominations represented." Additionally, court noted:

Neither party has questioned the constitutionality of RFRA, and it is therefore not an issue before the court." [citing Canedy v. Boardman, and Flores v. City of Boerne, supra] . . . . The constitutionality of RFRA aside, the practicality of applying 'the compelling interest test' in the prison context is questionable.