Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 1995). After city denied mission's application for property use, mission challenged city zoning code under RFRA and 1st Amendment. Court found that city code was neutral and of general applicability and did not otherwise violate 1st Amendment. Describing a substantial burden as preventing the individual from having a religious experience the faith mandated, court found that code did not "prevent [the mission] from engaging in such conduct anywhere in Daytona Beach," and thus created no substantial burden under RFRA. Even if a substantial burden could be shown, court observed, city had adopted least restrictive means of advancing its compelling interest in regulating homeless shelters and food banks.

DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ, 890 P.2d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. January 5, 1995) (as modified on denial of rehearing) cert. pending. In suit by minor of church counselor and church for alleged inappropriate touching and other tortious conduct, court rejected defendants' argument that, under the evidence presented below, liability couldn't be imposed without offending the Free Exercise Clause. However, court also ruled that, if the evidence was essentially the same on retrial, the jury should be instructed to rule for defendants if it determined counselor's conduct was based on sincere religious beliefs. Concurring judge raised RFRA, noting that the Act "modifie[d] state tort law pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the [14th] Amendment legislatively." Concurring judge also argued that "allowing a tort remedy without, at a minimum, an instruction [as set forth in the majority opinion] would substantially burden" counselor and church's free exercise and that "without such an instruction, there is no compelling state interest here to allow plaintiffs to pursue a tort remedy." Dissenting judge argued that protection under the Free Exercise Clause was not available to defendants.

In re Delaware County Prison, 1995 WL 225431 (E.D. Pa. April 13, 1995). Court approved settlement agreement in class action because it found the agreement would "ensure that Muslim inmates will be able to practice their religion to the same extent as other religious groups, and it will provide clear guidelines for the prison in evaluating inmates' demands."

Diaz v. Collins, 51 F.3d 1041 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 1995). Native American inmate alleged that certain prison policies, including rules regarding hair length and headbands, violated his rights under RFRA. Court found that, to the extent such policies inhibited the free exercise of religion, they were narrowly tailored to advance the compelling state interest of prison security. Other cases holding that, even if prison substantially burdened inmate's free exercise, a narrowly tailored, compelling state interest supported state's action: Fawaad v. Herring, 874 F. Supp. 350 (N.D.Al. January 24, 1995)(prison safety required use of Sunni Muslim inmate's "committed" name as well as religious name); Best v. Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. March 16, 1995)(prison security required temporary removal of converted Jew's name from alternative diet list and denial of permission to attend congregational services and meetings that were not "essential" to his religion).

Dickerson v. Stuart, 877 F. Supp. 1556 (M.D. Fla. February, 10, 1995). In accordance with her religious beliefs, plaintiff prays for, encourages and assists parents in giving birth at home but does not hold herself out as a midwife. Court dismissed plaintiff's claims that threats of criminal prosecution under midwife statute violated RFRA, finding no substantial burden on free exercise because plaintiff had not alleged that, to obtain a midwifery license, she would have to "perform acts forbidden by her religion," or "having obtained a license, she would thereafter be prohibited from practicing her religion." Even assuming a substantial burden, court found a compelling state interest in health.

Dickinson v. Austin, 60 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. June 30, 1995). Inmate appealed judgment below, claiming that defendants violated his religious freedom by prohibiting him from wearing a swastika medallion. Although court noted that RFRA became law subsequent to the lower court's judgment, it affirmed the lower court's judgment because it found that the inmate "ha[d] not provided any facts which show that the prison's policy of prohibiting him from wearing a swastika medallion is a 'substantial' burden that 'interferes with a tenet of belief that is central to his religion doctrine. ' " (citing Bryant v. Gomez, supra).

Droz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. June 1, 1995). Claiming religious objection to Social Security system, plaintiff appealed lower court's determination of tax deficiency attributable to unpaid self-employment Social Security taxes. Plaintiff conceded, however, that he did not belong to a religious organization and thus was ineligible for a tax exemption. Citing United States v. Lee and RFRA, the court affirmed the judgment below, stating that the government had a compelling interest in a fiscally sound Social Security system.

EEOC v. Catholic University, No. 94-5263, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11205, (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1996). A female canon law professor claimed Title VII gender discrimination when a Roman Catholic university denied her tenure. The court affirmed the district judge's dismissal of the case on 1st Amendment grounds, stating that the Free Exercise Clause prohibited judicial review of her claim because she was "the fundamental equivalent of a minister," and a Title VII claim would require intrusion by the government in religious affairs that is forbidden by the Establishment Clause. The court stated that the "ministerial exception" to Title VII protection survived Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and. also applies to lay employees whose primary duties are of a ministerial nature. The court opined that RFRA is constitutional, that it applies retroactively, and that the government's interest in eliminating employment discrimination is insufficient to overcome a religious institution's interest in employing the ministers of its choice.

Fence v. Jackson County, 900 P.2d 524 (Or. Ct. App. July 26, 1995). County challenged Land Use Board of Appeals' ("LUBA") determination that, as applied to Native American plaintiff, ordinance's provisions relating to outdoor mass gatherings did not comply with RFRA. Court rejected county's argument that plaintiff's objections to the ordinance were not justiciable until he had sought and been denied a permit for a religious activity. Court stated that "a person challenging a law's compliance with [RFRA] need not await a formal implementing action den[ying] a specific use," and remanded for consideration of the constitutional issues.

First Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. May 5, 1994) modified and reh'g denied, 27 F.3d 526 (11th Cir. August 3, 1994) cert. denied, January 9, 1995. Church appealed summary judgment in favor of county, claiming enforcement of zoning provisions to church's homeless shelter violated church's free exercise. Appellate court affirmed, stating that the provisions were neutral and of general applicability. Court later modified its opinion to note that, although RFRA "may apply" to the case, it was not raised by either party, and thus was not discussed.

Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) Three-judge panel ruled unanimously that RFRA was constitutional, reversing and remanding a lower court decision. Court held that RFRA did not 1) exceed Congress' power under § 5 of 14th Amendment 2) violate separation of powers 3) violate Establishment Clause or 4) violate 10th Amendment. Court also noted: "Whether RFRA's requirement that judges determine whether a particular law 'substantially burdens' the exercise of religion imposes upon the judiciary the duty of inquiring into the centrality of particular practices to a faith and whether that duty, if it exists, poses constitutional difficulties is not presented." (citation omitted)

Fordham University v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684 (D.D.C. June 29, 1994). See 60 Fed. Reg. 66491 (Dec. 22, 1995) for regulatory response to this case. Federal agency determined Fordham University's radio station was ineligible for federal funding of equipment because it broadcasts Catholic Mass weekly. Fordham sued, claiming government policy constituted RFRA violation. Court granted defendant's summary judgment motion, stating: 1) "[i]n no way is a failure to subsidize a 'burden'" on free exercise, and 2) agency's attempt to comply with Establishment Clause constituted a compelling interest.

Francis v. Keane, 888 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1995). Rastafarian correctional officers challenged prison grooming directive both on its face and as applied, claiming it violated RFRA and 1st Amendment. Court denied prison's motion for summary judgment, finding there were "substantial factual issues concerning both whether the defendants' actions were necessary to advance a compelling interest and whether the defendants' actions were even reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Court also noted that, although it and other courts analyzed RFRA and 1st Amendment claims as distinct causes of actions with different standards, other courts "appl[ied] the test contained in RFRA to claims brought under the Constitution as well as to claims brought under the statute."

Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. September 19, 1995). In previous ruling, court granted Roman Catholic inmates' motion for attorney's fees and costs after inmates and county officials settled lawsuit concerning religious service issues and access to certain sacramental articles (rosary beads and scapulars). On remand from U.S. Supreme Court for re-examination of attorney fees' award, court re-affirmed original award and awarded inmates fees for time defending award. Dissenting judge argued that award was improper, stating:

[The majority's affirmation of the award] has created an unexplained conflict with our case of Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995) by implicitly granting rights to Roman Catholics which are denied to other religious denominations. It must be understood that at no time during the course of this litigation has any authority of the Catholic Church maintained that the defendants deprived inmates of access to any tenet or belief mandated by the Catholic Church. (emphasis added)

George v. Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895 (W.D. Wisc. July 17, 1995). Inmate alleged violation of 1st Amendment and RFRA due to prison's denial of access to Church of Jesus Christ Christian materials -- information inmate admitted fostered racial animosity. Court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that the ban on such materials was narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interest of prison safety. For this reason, court declined to address defendant's challenge to RFRA's constitutionality.

Geraci v. Eckankar, 526 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. App. January 17, 1995). Former employee of church of Eckankar appealed partial summary judgment grant in favor of church, arguing that lower court erred in concluding that Establishment Clause and state constitution insulated a religious employer from claims brought by a non-minister alleging wrongful discharge. In addition to considering the Establishment Clause issue, court stated that lower court should have applied RFRA rather than Smith to church's free exercise defense. However, because court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's discharge-based claims on Establishment Clause and state constitutional grounds, it found that the free exercise issue was moot.

Germantown Seventh Day Adventist Church v. City of Philadelphia, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163 (E.D. Pa. August 26, 1994). Zoning dispute regarding an addition to a church prompted the church to claim that a zoning code provision was unconstitutional on its face or as applied to religious institutions. Court ruled that RFRA did not apply because the church had "utterly failed to show that anyone's freedom of religion was affected, let alone 'substantially burden[ed],' by the city's zoning provisions."

Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 60 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. July 27, 1995). Court rejected parents' RFRA and 1st Amendment claim that school board must provide their hearing-impaired child with a cued speech translator in his private sectarian school. Court noted that "[i]t is well established that there is no substantial burden placed on an individual's free exercise of religion where a law or policy merely 'operates so as to make the practice of [the individual's] religious beliefs more expensive.' " [citation omitted] Citing U.S. Supreme Court unemployment compensation cases, court also found no substantial burden because the parents "have neither been compelled to engage in conduct proscribed by their religious beliefs, nor have they been forced to abstain from any action which their religion mandates." Finally, court found board's refusal to provide the device unobjectionable under Smith.

Grand Fraternity Rosae Crucis v. Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, 1995 WL 572912 (E.D. Pa. September 26, 1995). Religious organization and its "Supreme Grand Master" sued state court and court-appointed custodian, alleging violations of RFRA and 1st Amendment arising out of state court litigation over intra-organization dispute. Court dismissed complaint against state court on 11th Amendment grounds, ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over free exercise claims of Supreme Grand Master, but was unable to determine at this stage whether it lacked such jurisdiction over potential claims by organization.

Haff v. Cooke, No. CIV.A.94-C-0332, 1996 WL 180689 (E.D. Wis. April 12, 1996). Court granted summary judgment for defendants on Christian Identity inmate's claim that seizure of white supremacist materials violated RFRA and 1st Amendment. Although it ruled that confiscation substantially burdened inmate's religious exercise, adopting the "religiously motivated" test, court found compelling interests justifying confiscation. In the court's view, giving more protection from confiscation to materials used for religious reasons than for similar materials used for political reasons would violate 1st Amendment's Free Speech and Establishment Clause. Court further ruled that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Noting confusion surrounding RFRA's threshold analysis and a "weakening" of the compelling interest/least restrictive means test in the prison context, court concluded: "If neither Congress nor the courts interpret RFRA's requirements consistently, courts cannot expect state officials to understand the laws better than the supposed experts." Therefore the court declined to address defendants' challenge to RFRA's constitutionality.

Hall v. Griego, 896 F. Supp. 1043 (D. Colo. August 10, 1995). Nation of Islam inmate claimed retaliatory transfer and ban on religious headgear violated RFRA and 1st Amendment. Court denied defendants' request for summary judgment on these claims, finding that, "under Werner [v. McCotter, infra]," inmate had stated a claim that prison had denied him a "reasonable opportunity" to engage in activities "fundamental" to his religion and failed to show a narrowly tailored compelling interest. However, court also found that inmate's recovery would be limited to equitable relief because qualified immunity shielded defendants from pecuniary liability.

Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. January 12, 1996), reh'g denied, April 1, 1996. Appellate court reversed lower court's order enjoining prison officials from enforcing hair length regulation and requiring provision of weekly sweat lodge ceremony for Native American inmate. Court emphasized that its decision did not "foreclose the possibility of a successful sweat lodge claim under different circumstances," and "encourage[d] prisons to accommodate the religious needs of inmates, including American Indian inmates, by providing facilities beyond the bare minimum." It found, however, that prison regulations at issue did not violate 1st Amendment or RFRA because they were narrowly tailored to advance compelling interests such as prison safety. With regard to the least restrictive means analysis, court noted:

Although RFRA places the burden of production and persuasion on the prison officials, once the government provides this evidence, the prisoner must demonstrate what, if any, less restrictive means remain unexplored. It would be a herculean burden to require prison administrators to refute every conceivable option in order to satisfy the least restrictive means prong of RFRA. Moreover, such an onerous requirement would be irreconcilable with the well-established principle, recognized by the Supreme Court and RFRA's legislative history, that prison administrators must be accorded due deference in creating regulations and policies directed at the maintenance of prison safety and security. (footnote omitted)(citation omitted)

Court stated that it need not consider RFRA's constitutionality because it found inmate's claim deficient under constitutional or RFRA analysis. In dissent, Judge McMillian argued that Congress was without power to enact RFRA under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, stating that "Section 5 grants Congress the power to supplement, not subvert, the Supreme Court's underlying constitutional jurisprudence."

Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free School District, No. 95-7311, 95-7333, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 11294 (2d Cir. May 15, 1996). Plaintiff desired to form a Christian Bible club at a secondary school. School district prohibited club from discriminating on the basis of religion in membership and officership. The lower court denied plaintiff's claim under Federal Equal Access Act, ruling that since the non-discrimination policy applied to all non-curriculum related clubs, it had provided the Bible club "equal access" and it also denied plaintiff's claim under RFRA holding that, even assuming non-discrimination policy burdened plaintiff's free exercise, school district's interest in eliminating and preventing religious discrimination was "compelling," and interest could not be advanced by any means less restrictive than the outright ban on discrimination. The 2d Circuit, focusing on the Equal Access claim, found that having a Christian President, Vice-President and Music Coordinator is essential to the expressive content of the club's meetings and to the preservation of its purpose and identity, and is therefore protected. The court held, however, that club provisions limiting leadership to Christians was not defensible for other officers, such as the Secretary and Activities Coordinator, whose duties are not "unambiguously religious."

Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843 (Vt. August 5, 1994). Member of religious commune argued that lower court's child support and contempt orders violated his free exercise rights under RFRA and 1st Amendment. Court recognized that "[a] state-imposed obligation that indirectly compels defendant to risk significant penalties if he chooses to adhere to his faith creates a substantial free exercise burden." Court upheld the child support order as the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest of fostering parental support of children, but vacated contempt order because the state had not shown that it was narrowly tailored. A dissenting opinion criticized the majority's application of RFRA to the child support order, stating that "[t]he [RFRA] plainly demands more than this lip-service tribute to the free exercise of religion."

Hutchinson v. Lehman, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 941 (E.D. Pa. January 27, 1995). Muslim inmates claimed that prison's failure to allow them to engage in a Jumah service at a particular time of day violated their rights under RFRA. Court denied inmates' motion for preliminary injunction because it found that the inmates had not shown irreparable harm as well as likelihood of success on the merits. Court noted that Islamic doctrine did not "mandate" that the service occur precisely at a specific time of day.

Ishmawiyl v. Vaugh, 1995 WL 461949 (E.D. Pa. August 1. 1995). Citing RFRA and 1st Amendment, Muslim mother of inmate who refused to remove her veil in presence of male non-family members sought to preliminarily enjoin prison policy requiring visitors' faces to be visible upon entry and departure from prison. Court denied plaintiff's motion, finding that "permitting the unveiling to occur only in the presence of a female corrections officer represents the least restrictive means of furthering [the compelling interest of prison safety]" and that "restricting plaintiff's visiting opportunities to times when a female corrections officer is available . . . does not render the accommodation unreasonable."

Jesus Center v. Farmington Hills Zoning Board of Appeals, 532 N.W. 2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. January 12, 1996). Church desiring to provide homeless shelter appealed denial of zoning approval for such "accessory use," claiming 1st Amendment and RFRA violations. Ruling under RFRA, court affirmed order reversing denial of accessory use and remanding case for guidelines on shelter operation. Court found shelter services constituted religious exercise, emphasizing that "[i]t is not the job of the courts to second guess 'what activities are sufficiently religious'" and noting that such charity was a longstanding Christian tradition. Recognizing that relocation of the shelter program would pose an economic burden and make the Center's "witness" more difficult, court found substantial burden. Further, court noted:

RFRA is not satisfied because the [zoning ordinance] could be interpreted to permit The Jesus Center to operate the shelter program as an accessory use, but only if other churches customarily operated similar programs. . . . It is substantially burdensome to limit a church to activities and programs that are commonly practiced by other churches rather than allowing it to follow its faith even in unique and novel ways. (footnote omitted)

For purposes of its analysis, court assumed zoning board's action furthered a compelling interest, but found interest was not narrowly tailored. "The [z]oning [b]oard's decision to apply the [o]rdinance to completely prohibit the shelter service program when too far under RFRA anaylsis."

Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, No. 95-1347-CIV-T-17A (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1996). Plaintiff brought a RFRA claim after being prohibited from distributing religious literature at an airport. The court upheld the constitutionality of RFRA, but granted summary judgment for defendant on grounds of mootness. Airport policy was changed to permit distribution of literature and defendant asserted that it would not prohibit distribution in the future. The court found "no reasonable expectation" that defendant would return to a ban on religious literature.

Jolly v. Coughlin, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1757 (2d Cir. February 7, 1996). Rastafarian inmate confined to "medical keeplock" for approximately 3 and 1/2 years due to refusal to submit to "latent" TB screening test claimed RFRA violation. Court affirmed preliminary injunction grant, finding inmate had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success under RFRA and irreparable harm. In its analysis of the substantial burden test, court observed:

Our scrutiny extends only to whether a claimant holds a particular belief and whether the belief is religious in nature. An inquiry any more intrusive would be inconsistent with our nation's fundamental commitment to individual religious freedom; thus, courts are not permitted to ask whether a particular belief is appropriate or true -- however unusual or unfamiliar the belief may be. While it is a delicate task to evaluate religious sincerity, without questioning religious verity, our free exercise doctrine is based upon the premise that courts are capable of distinguishing between these two questions. (citation omitted)

Court also stated that prison testing policy "is not insulated from scrutiny merely because the defendants brandish the concepts of public health and safety; as RFRA's legislative history suggests, the connection between the application of a policy to an individual and the furtherance of the government's goals must be clear." Court concluded that "[t]he current record is simply devoid of evidence that allowing a religious exemption . . . would jeopardize the discovery of TB or result in a flood of prisoners refusing to take the TB test."